Pluralism and complexity without integration? A critical appraisal of Mitchell’s integrative pluralism

  1. Deulofeu, Roger 1
  2. Suárez, Javier 2
  1. 1 Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
    info

    Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

    Barcelona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/052g8jq94

  2. 2 Universidad de Oviedo
    info

    Universidad de Oviedo

    Oviedo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/006gksa02

Revista:
Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

ISSN: 0495-4548

Año de publicación: 2023

Título del ejemplar: Sandra Mitchell’s Lullius Lectures. Sandra Mitchell’s contribution to philosophy of science

Volumen: 38

Número: 3

Páginas: 299-317

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1387/THEORIA.23871 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science

Resumen

Este artículo examina de manera crítica la noción de pluralismo integrativo de Sandra Mitchell. Según el pluralismo integrativo, las explicaciones científicas deben integrar descripciones de diferentes niveles ontológicos para ser científicamente sólidas. En este artículo argumentamos que, si bien el pluralismo integrador es una estrategia fundamental de la ciencia contemporánea, existen razones específicas por las cuales no se debe esperar que la integración en el sentido articulado por Mitchell sea la estrategia óptima y aquella a la que los científicos deban apuntar siempre. Utilizando ejemplos de la biología contemporánea, argumentamos que la integración a veces no es ni epistémicamente deseable ni ontológicamente alcanzable. Concluimos que el pluralismo integrador debería limitarse a una clase específica de sistemas complejos, pero no puede generalizarse como la estrategia de investigación preferible sin obtener más información sobre las prácticas epistémicas de la comunidad científica o la ontología del sistema bajo investigación.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet