Una defensa de las axiologías centradas en el sufrimiento

  1. Amanda Briones Marrero 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Oviedo. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras
Revista:
Agora: Papeles de filosofía

ISSN: 0211-6642

Any de publicació: 2022

Volum: 41

Número: 1

Pàgines: 13-25

Tipus: Article

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Altres publicacions en: Agora: Papeles de filosofía

Resum

Este artículo realiza una defensa de las axiologías centradas en el sufrimiento, que sostienen la prioridad de evitar el sufrimiento frente a la promoción de otros valores. Para ello, explica en primer lugar cómo ciertas cuestiones relativas a la creación de individuos sugieren la existencia de una asimetría entre el sufrimiento y la felicidad. Continúa describiendo un conjunto de argumentos a favor de la prioridad del sufrimiento relativos a individuos ya existentes. Asimismo, señala y responde a distintas objeciones que podrían ser dirigidas contra estas axiologías. Finalmente, concluye que las posiciones centradas en el sufrimiento no están todavía lo bastante exploradas y pueden tener un gran potencial

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