El mercado como objeto de regulación y protección jurídicael caso de las restricciones verticales a la competencia

  1. José Manuel Paredes Castañón 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Oviedo
    info

    Universidad de Oviedo

    Oviedo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/006gksa02

Revista:
Revista penal México

ISSN: 2007-4700

Año de publicación: 2021

Número: 18

Páginas: 141-170

Tipo: Artículo

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openArias Montano editor

Otras publicaciones en: Revista penal México

Resumen

El artículo intenta elaborar una definición clara y suficiente precisa de la competencia como objeto de protección y de regulación a través del Derecho Penal económico. Para ello, se utilizan las herramientas propias del análisis económico, para dotar de un contenido material lo más concreto posible a dicho concepto, y se aplican dichas herramientas a un caso concreto: el de las restricciones verticales a la competencia. Se propone que, como regla general, aquello que el Derecho ha de proteger en estos casos es la maximización del bienestar social. Se estudian asimismo, no obstante, algunos casos especiales en los que dicha definición no resulta suficiente, proponiéndose para ellos criterios complementarios de definición, que atiendan a necesidades de justicia distributiva y de protección del sistema político frente a los monopolios

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