Bank ownership, lending relationships and capital structureEvidence from Spain

  1. Carlos Fernández-Méndez 1
  2. Victor M. González 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Oviedo
    info

    Universidad de Oviedo

    Oviedo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/006gksa02

Revista:
Business Research Quarterly

ISSN: 2340-9444,  2340-9436

Año de publicación: 2019

Volumen: 22

Número: 2

Páginas: 137-154

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.BRQ.2018.05.002 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Business Research Quarterly

Resumen

Este artículo analiza la influencia de la propiedad bancaria y del crédito en la estructura de capital de una muestra de empresas españolas cotizadas y no cotizadas en el período 2005-2012. Los resultados sugieren que la propiedad bancaria permite a los bancos obtener mejor información y reducir los costos de agencia de la deuda, ya que tiene una relación positiva con el vencimiento de la deuda y una relación negativa con el costo de la deuda. Estos resultados son consistentes con el predominio del efecto de seguimiento en la propiedad bancaria sobre el efecto de expropiación. El papel de los bancos como accionistas y prestamistas también contribuye a reducir el costo de la deuda de agencia, ya que reduce el costo de la deuda.

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Información de financiación

Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness via Projects ECO2012-31772 and ECO2015-66184-R is gratefully acknowledged

Financiadores

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