Un análisis internacional de la política retributiva del CEO

  1. Rubén Arrondo García
  2. Carlos Fernández Méndez
Revista:
Universia Business Review

ISSN: 1698-5117

Año de publicación: 2014

Número: 43

Páginas: 36-57

Tipo: Artículo

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Otras publicaciones en: Universia Business Review

Resumen

Este trabajo analiza desde una óptica internacional la retribución del principal ejecutivo (CEO) para una muestra de empresas cotizadas durante el año 2010. Nuestros principales resultados sugieren que existen diferencias relevantes, tanto en la cuantía como en la estructura retributiva en los diez países objeto de estudio, siendo la principal diferencia: el mayor uso de fórmulas de retribución variable a largo plazo en Estados Unidos y a corto plazo en Europa. Asimismo, no se observan diferencias importantes entre la retribución de los CEOs del sector financiero frente a los CEOs de otros sectores. Por último, se constata la relevancia de la estructura de propiedad y de gobierno corporativo en la remuneración del CEO.

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