Un análisis internacional de la política retributiva del CEO

  1. Rubén Arrondo García
  2. Carlos Fernández Méndez
Journal:
Universia Business Review

ISSN: 1698-5117

Year of publication: 2014

Issue: 43

Pages: 36-57

Type: Article

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Abstract

This paper analyses from an international perspective the compensation of the chief executive officer (CEO) for a sample of listed companies in 2010. Our main results suggest that there are significant differences in both the amount and the structure of the CEO’s compensation in the ten countries surveyed; being the main difference the more intense use of long term variable compensation formulae in the US as compared to the prevalent use of short term variable compensation components in Europe. Interestingly enough, we have not reported significant differences between the CEO’s compensation in the financial and non-financial sectors. Finally, we note a relevant influence of the ownership and corporate governance structure on CEO compensation.

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