Discrecionalidad directiva y creación de valor en la formación de alianzas globales para la internacionalización

Abstract

In this paper we analyse to which extent global alliances can be used by CEOs to reinforce their security in their position at the expense of shareholders' wealth. We argue that there are at least three different ways through which global alliances can reinforce the CEO's position. First, they can make it necessary the continuity of the top management team during the negotiation and execution phases of the alliance. Second, they may increase the CEO's visibility and prestige. Finally, they can increase the CEO's control over the governance boards. Due to these facts, global alliances are an attractive growth option for CEOs in a weak position. Results obtained on a sample of 71 global alliances formed by Spanish companies between 1987-1997 confirm that abnormal returns decrease when alliances are formed by firms whose CEOs are in a weak position