Compatibilizando pensiones por discapacidad y empleo en España

  1. Miguel Ángel MALO 1
  2. Begoña CUETO 2
  3. Vanesa RODRÍGUEZ 2
  1. 1 Universidad de Salamanca

    Universidad de Salamanca

    Salamanca, España


  2. 2 Universidad de Oviedo

    Universidad de Oviedo

    Oviedo, España


Papeles de economía española

ISSN: 0210-9107

Year of publication: 2019

Issue: 161

Pages: 55-70

Type: Article

More publications in: Papeles de economía española


In this article, we analyze the compatibilization of disability pensions with employment in Spain. We begin with a review of the academic literature, which focuses on the employment disincentives related with the size of disability benefits. However, international organizations highlight the need of making more compatible disability pensions and employment in cases of partial disability -i.e. when the worker retain a substantial working capacity for different jobs after the disability onset. The Spanish case is interesting because there is a specific disability pension designed for those cases, the so-called ‘incapacidad permanente total’ (total permanent disability). Thanks to micro-data from the ‘Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales’, we find that compatibilization is more usual one year after the disability pension access. Younger beneficiaries of pensions -and, therefore, with a much shorter trajectory of contributions to social security – make compatible pension and employment much more frequently; in fact, compatibilization heavily decreases for pensioners over 50 years old. We discuss some political interventions to facilitate compatibilization of disability pensions and employment in Spain, remarking the importance of the design of pensions and not only their size. In any case, changes should focus on the first months after the access to the disability pension.

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