Los valores como recursos epistémicos en las críticas feministas de la ciencia

  1. González García, Marta I. 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Oviedo
    info

    Universidad de Oviedo

    Oviedo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/006gksa02

Revista:
Scio

ISSN: 1887-9853

Año de publicación: 2022

Título del ejemplar: Pensamiento crítico

Número: 22

Páginas: 235-263

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.46583/SCIO_2022.22.1012 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Scio

Resumen

En este trabajo se analizan las aportaciones de las críticas feministas para el debate actual sobre el papel de los valores no epistémicos en la ciencia. La revitalización de la discusión sobre los valores y la responsabilidad social de la ciencia en las últimas décadas responde a preocupaciones como la crisis de la replicabilidad, la creciente comercialización o el papel de la ciencia para la política. En todas ellas la influencia de valores de carácter no epistémico aparece como problemática. La crítica feminista, no obstante, proporciona ejemplos del funcionamiento de los valores políticos como recursos para una crítica constructiva que, acompañada de reflexividad y capacidad de autocorrección por parte de las comunidades implicadas, puede promover los propios objetivos epistémicos de la ciencia. Utilizaré dos ejemplos bien conocidos, la primatología y la neurociencia cognitiva, para discutir la interacción de lo epistémico y lo no epistémico en las críticas feministas. Los casos analizados servirán también para explorar la propia interacción de valores en la recepción de las críticas y para introducir la discusión sobre el denominado “nuevo problema de la demarcación”.

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Fuente de los datos: Dialnet