Do Movie Majors Really Collude? Indirect Evidence from Release Schedules

  1. Fernanda Gutiérrez-Navratil 2
  2. Víctor Fernández-Blanco 1
  3. Luis Orea-Sánchez 1
  4. Juan Prieto-Rodríguez 1
  1. 1 Universidad de Oviedo
    info

    Universidad de Oviedo

    Oviedo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/006gksa02

  2. 2 Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
    info

    Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea

    Lejona, España

    ROR https://ror.org/000xsnr85

Revista:
Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics

ISSN: 0210-1173

Año de publicación: 2017

Título del ejemplar: Cultural Economics

Número: 221

Páginas: 9-31

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.7866/HPE-RPE.17.2.1 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics

Resumen

Major Hollywood films studios and their affiliated local distributors have a dominant market share in the main international movie markets, but their competitive behavior has come under suspicion. In 2006, the Spanish Competition Court fined these Majors for anticompetitive practices. Our aim is to evaluate the presence (or absence) of collusive behavior among Majors during the 2002-2009 period. Because the release date is a critical variable of competition, we test whether Majors are coordinating their release schedules. Our results suggest that Majors achieve a larger degree of coordination in their release schedules than other distributors.

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