La RSC en la relación entre composición del consejo y valor de mercado de la empresa

  1. Nieto Antolín, Mariano
  2. Fernández Gago, Roberto
  3. Cabeza García, Laura
Revista:
Papeles de economía española

ISSN: 0210-9107

Año de publicación: 2012

Número: 132

Páginas: 315-328

Tipo: Artículo

Otras publicaciones en: Papeles de economía española

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