¿Financian los franquiciados la expansión de los franquiciadores?evidencia para el caso español

  1. Solís Rodríguez, Vanesa
  2. González Díaz, Manuel
Revista:
Pecunia: revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales

ISSN: 1699-9495

Año de publicación: 2008

Número: 6

Páginas: 153-174

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.18002/PEC.V0I6.705 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openDialnet editor

Otras publicaciones en: Pecunia: revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales

Resumen

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar si la dificultad para acceder a los recursos financieros es un factor determinante de la propensión franquiciadora de las cadenas españolas. Para ello, se ha tomado como muestra un panel de datos formado por cadenas observadas entre 1996 y 2002. Además, empleamos un modelo dinámico de ajuste parcial de la estructura de propiedad de las cadenas utilizando el método generalizado de los momentos en primeras diferencias, lo que nos permite, no sólo introducir un componente autorregresivo, sino también el empleo de variables explicativas endógenas. Los resultados obtenidos muestran que cuanto mayor es la liquidez y la rentabilidad económica y menor es el endeudamiento de una determinada cadena menor es su propensión franquiciadora, lo que apoya el argumento financiero. Por el contrario, los requisitos de inversión necesarios para la expansión no son significativos. Además, la antigüedad presenta un signo contrario al previsto. Finalmente, observamos que se verifica el modelo de ajuste parcial de la estructura de propiedad, obteniendo una elevada velocidad de ajuste, entre un 78-69%.

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