El gobierno de la empresamecanismos alineadores y supervisores de las actuaciones directivas

  1. Gómez Ansón, Silvia
  2. Fernández Álvarez, Ana Isabel
Journal:
Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

ISSN: 0210-2412

Year of publication: 1999

Issue: 100

Pages: 355-380

Type: Article

More publications in: Revista española de financiación y contabilidad

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to review the state ot the art regarding corporate governance, making an special reference to the empirical evidence. For that purpose we analyze the main characteristics and differences between the two main corporate governance systems, internal and external systems. We also survey the efficiency ot monitoring mechanisms such as the management team¿s compensation scheme, ownership and capital structure, the board of directors and the market for coroporate control and imputs and outputs market.

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